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Summary findings
What strategies have Russian households used to cope  The results of their analysis show that a household's
with economic hardship in the wake of the recent  choice of survival strategy strongly depends on its human
financial crisis? Which coping strategies have been most  capital: the higher its level of human capital, the more
effective in reducing poverty for different groups of  likely it is to choose an active strategy (such as finding a
households? And how have people been able to adapt to  supplementary job or increasing home production).
the dramatic drop in formal cash incomes?  Households with low levels of human capital, those
Lokshin and Yemtsov look at these questions using  headed by pensioners, and those whose members have
subjective evaluations of coping strategies used by  low levels of education are more likely to suffer social
household survey respondents to mitigate the effects of  exclusion. To prevent poverty from becoming
the Russian financial crisis on their welfare. The data  entrenched, the trend toward marginalization and
come from two rounds (1996 and 1998) of the Russian  impoverishment of these groups of households needs to
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey.  be monitored and targeted policy interventions need to
be undertaken to reverse the trend.
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The Russian financial crisis of August 1998 affected the living standard of households in a variety
of ways. However, for the majority of Russians, the impact of the crises was disastrous. The
devaluation of the ruble resulted in a sharp decline in household incomes, rising unemployment, and
increasing poverty rates. The collapse of commercial banks effectively deprived most Russians of
their hard  earned savings and  once again undermined the trust  of the population  in financial
institutions.
When the crisis peaked in early 1999, real incomes were at their lowest level since January
1992. However, this crisis was not the first turmoil in the Russian market transition. The entire
period witnessed considerable volatility and a series of severe setbacks (the sharpest - but not the
only one - being "black Thursday" in October 1994). Moreover, arrears built up to constitute an
amount comparable to the total wage bill and transfer payments in the economy; on average workers
were receiving wages more than a month late (Pinto, 1999). Practically every payment in Russia
became a  source of uncertainty (and has  continued to this  date). Throughout this  period the
deficiency of the public social safety net for protecting households from unemployment and poverty
was pervasive (Lokshin and Ravallion, 2000).
Russian households needed to find strategies to deal with the risk of unexpected fluctuations
in household income and to maintain a minimal level of consumption for their members. The
efficiency of such strategies explains why, despite worse expectations, the incidence of poverty after
the August  1998 crisis  had increased  only minimally  (Mroz  at el.  1999, World Bank  2000,
Roskomstat 1999).
While  risk  coping  strategies  in  transition  economies  respond  to  the  same  inherent
motivations as in the developing world, what they represent in practice differs (Bhalla and Lapeyre
1999). Socialism was an all-embracing system that penetrated every domain of political, economic,
and social life. The State provided the basis for inclusion and social cohesion. Except for limited
categories of individuals (such as political dissidents or institutionalized populations), everyone
officially "belonged;" most people were employed or fell into an ascribed, socially acceptable
alternative status (e.g. veteran, a mother of many children, a pensioner, disabled, etc.). The system
presented individuals with the idea that they were necessary to others and a feeling of "being in this
1together" for better or worse persisted. The rapid socioeconomic stratification that has taken place
during market reforms has ruptured many traditional ties that  formerly affirmed identity to a
collective.
Households in post-socialist  economies could not rely on traditional coping strategies
validated by generations, as in the developing world. Risk coping strategies developed by Russian
households over the transition years have by necessity been driven by market forces and a failure
of the State to provide sufficient fall-backs. By trial and error and by learning from each other they
developed their own responses to risks and vulnerability. In this process some households have
lagged behind others, failing in their adaptation; these households will suffer the most as they are
the ones further exposed to risks.
The analysis of household coping strategies is the focus of this paper. Given the dramatic
drop in formal cash incomes and lack of support from the government, how are most people able
to  adapt and maintain  a  standard of living?  Why do  some not  adapt? What  are the relative
importance and  effectiveness of  coping strategies (e.g. land,  informal  sector, informal  social
networks, community groups and associations, government allowances, informal sector activities,
etc.) in reducing poverty for different groups? Are people learning from each other how to cope with
uncertainty and crisis and how can the government facilitate this process?
To answer these questions we look at individual subjective evaluations of a number of
coping strategies that respondents in Russia undertook in 1998 to mitigate the effect of the crisis on
their welfare. We combine multiple activities into clusters that represent types of strategies dealing
with risk: relying on household resources, relying on social networks, and on cuts in household
expenditures.  We then  look  at the determinants  of why certain  households  chose  particular
strategies. Looking at the group that apparently has no meaningful strategy in response to the shock
(households who just cut on their spending to cope with the crisis), we identify patterns that make
these individuals likely to act in this passive way. We argue that as most of these characteristics are
unlikely to  change in the short-term, this  group faces the risk  of  being  subject to  circles  of
impoverishment and gradually fall outside society's social fabric. Moreover, we believe that the
trend toward marginalization and impoverishment of this group should be expressly monitored, and
a specific set of policy interventions should be targeted to avoid the entrenchment of poverty.
2The paper is organized as following. The next section discusses the data and main welfare
indicators we use. Section 3 provides a description of the various coping strategies employed by the
Russian households. In Section 4 we analyze how household characteristics influence the choice of
coping strategies. Section 5 discusses the concept of social exclusion and analyzes the factors that
influence the probability for households to be marginalized. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data and definitions
Our data comes from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), a comprehensive
survey of all aspects (factors) of living, based on the first nationally-representative sample of several
thousand households across the Russian Federation 2. The data is drawn from the two rounds of
RLMS conducted in October1  996 (round VII, with a total sample size of 3,750 households) and in
November of 1998 (round VIII, with a total sample size 3,831 households). We use the panel sample
of  2,875  households  for  whom  we  have  complete  information  on  expenditure,  household
composition and individual characteristics of its members for both rounds of the survey. We tracked
6,869 adults over the 1996 and 19983  rounds.
The  focus of  our  analysis  is  on  coping strategies.  Traditionally,  researchers employ
"objective" measures, tracing over time how household members actually act in response to adverse
external conditions. Though such approach can be appealing, it is subject to substantial measurement
biases: some observed responses may be exogenous and not reflect the true household member's
choice.
2  The weights  and a range  of issues  related  to the sample  design  and collection  of these  data are
explained  in depth  in the documents  that can  be found in the home  page of the RLMS.  The data sets can
be obtained  free  through  the home  page: www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/rlms_home.html.  Lokshin  and
Popkin  (1999),  and Lokshin,  Popkin,  Harris  (2000)  give  additional  information  on the sample  and data
set.
3  Lokshin  and Ravallion  (2000)  showed  that households  that were re-interviewed  in 1998  tended  to
have slightly  higher  expenditure  per-equivalent-adult  in 1996,  have  more  household  members,  and were
more likely  to reside  in rural  areas.  While  the characteristics  of the two samples  are quite similar,  we
cannot  rule out the possibility  of non-random  attrition  such  that some  of the poorest  in 1996  dropped  out
of the second  round,  and this may  well  have  been due to the crisis.  Thus, the following  results  based on
the panel  sample  might  underestimate  the welfare  impact  of the  crisis.
3Additionally, many coping mechanisms are simply too difficult to observe with traditional
sets of variables from household surveys. Many economic activities are difficultly expressed in
monetary value terms. High and unstable rates of inflation, a price system that is often a mixture of
market and nonmarket prices varying by region, errors in recall, and measurement errors make it
problematic to assign monetary value to certain household behaviors (Hanson, 1993). Household
data registers various kinds of transactions within and between households; e.g., monetary gifts and
assistance from relatives or friends, and aid from government and non-government organizations.
However, informal inter- and intra-household transactions such as grandparents taking care of
grandchildren,  relatives helping on the family's land plot, in-kind transactions between the members
of extended households, and many other household activities are important factors that affect the
household's welfare but, at the same time, are difficult to monetarize and register.
Consequently, the strategy that we employ in this paper is to use subjective indicators of the
number and characteristics of strategies chosen by household members (more on this in the next
section). However, while explaining these choices we use objective household characteristics.
It is believed that aggregate consumption is the most robust measure of household welfare
(Grosh, Munoz 1996). Therefore, we use total household expenditure as a proportion of the poverty
line (e.g., Popkin at el, 1992) as an objective household welfare indicator in our analysis. This
includes cash expenditures and imputed expenditures for the goods and services that have been
produced by the household itself. The value of home produced food is calculated as a product of the
quantity of each food item produced and its prevailing regional market price.
3. Coping strategies: descriptive analysis
Economic crisis is among the most important roots of sharp increases in the incidence of poverty
around the world (Lustig, 1999). A poverty outcome of the crisis for a particular household depends
crucially to what extent a household is exposed to hazards of the crisis and its ability to respond or
to cope with such hazards (Holzmann and Jorgensen 1999). Since they do not have sufficient
savings or their self-insurance coverage is inadequate to see them through bad times (Bardhan and
Udry 1999), it is widely believed that poor households are likely to suffer the most. At the same
time, the ability to respond or cope with crisis is not a function of household resources alone, as
4informal family support networks play an important role during hardships by providing social and
economic benefits that the formal social security system fails to deliver (Cox and Jimenez 1990).
It is important to look at the full spectrum of responses that household members use to
manage the hazards of the crisis. A special section in the 1998 individual RLMS questionnaire asks
questions about coping strategies, introduced with the following statement:
In the lastyear the country has undergone many changes. People have tried to adjust to the
new living conditions in various ways. Tell me, which of all the things Iam now naming have
you done and how much have they helped you?
Sixteen possible activities followed. Though the reference period for the question goes back to
October 1997, the crisis was the most important event that affected the behavior of many Russian
households during this period. Consequently, we argue that what we observed are mainly strategies
in response to the August 1998 crisis.
In addition to the menu of options, the respondents also rated different strategies in terms
of how successful they were in helping to cope with the hardship. Table 1 gives an idea of how often
the individual strategies were used and how successful they were according to the respondents' own
accounts. A quick inspection shows that the most widely used options were not the most effective:
for example, cutting expenditure on clothes was used by 63 percent of respondents, but hardly 10
percent thought it was a successful strategy. On the other hand, "seeking help from the Government"
is a clear outlier both in terms of frequency of use and in terms of effectiveness. In fact, less than
5 percent of respondents turned to government agencies for assistance. Russian households are five
times more likely to seek help from the informal sector than to ask help from the government.
Similar numbers are reported in Zubova and Kovalyova (1997). Their analysis is based on VCIOM
(All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research) data and shows that only 5 percent of the
respondents in 1994 and 4 percent in 1996 indicated that they "would primary rely for help in need"
on government social security agencies.
Our further analysis excludes three questions from the original list; these are the questions
of whether a person changed his job,  went to work for a private or government enterprise, and
whether the person traveled for training in order to get a new job. We consider that some of these
changes may be accounted for by factors external to the household, not as a result of choice (for
example, loss of employment that leads to finding a new job). Therefore, it would not be possible
5to make meaningful comparisons across households. Those who were subject to greater shocks may
appear as more active.
Clear differences  exist in the use  of the strategies depending on the welfare level of
households. Even a simple cross tabulation indicates that those who were previously poor seem to
employ a much more limited set of options in response to crisis, and these options are often not
effective.
The distribution of the responses to the selected questions by the household expenditure
deciles (using a  1996 welfare level) is shown in Table 2. Respondents most  frequently report
changes in their consumption patterns in response to changes in economic conditions. More than 62
percent answered that they spent less on clothing and shoes. The decline in spending on such items
is more significant for the poorest households. About 66 percent of respondents from the first three
deciles of the expenditure distribution indicate that their spending on such goods was lower than in
pre-crisis period. For the richest three deciles, this proportion is lower than 60 percent and among
the households from the richest decile only about 50 percent of the individuals reduced spending on
clothing and shoes.
More than half of the respondents decreased their expenditures on food after the crisis.
Again, this decrease was not uniform. The highest proportion (about 63 percent) of the respondents
who reported that they "cut down on meals" came from the households in the lowest deciles of the
expenditure distribution. At the same time, only 36.5 percent of the respondents from the highest
expenditure deciles reported a decrease in consumption of food.
Twenty percent  indicated that their households cultivated more on their personal plot.
Individuals from the higher deciles seem to use their land more. Fifteen percent of the respondents
from the lowest deciles reported an increase in home production, while this proportion rose to about
22 percent for the highest expenditure deciles. To some degree this can be explained by the low
percentage of land owners among the poorest households.
The share of the respondents  who reported use of  other strategies  in  response to  the
economic crisis is low. Slightly more than 4 percent of households sold their belongings to cope
with poverty; only about 1 percent rented out their apartment or moved out from the relatives. The
proportion who changed their place of residence is surprisingly high: 5.1 percent (compared to a
widespread belief that workers in Russia are extremely immobile, e.g. documented in Helenyak
6(1997)). On average, 6.5 percent of respondents indicated that they found supplementary work to
adjust to the new economic conditions. The proportion of respondents who found secondary  jobs
is greater among the highest brackets of expenditure distribution.
Turning to strategies that are based on outside opportunities, a greater percentage (18 %) of
poor households sought help from relatives to cope with changing economic conditions. 7 percent
of poor households turned to friends for assistance. What emerges is a tendency for cohabitation as
an important strategy for coping with economic hardship. 3.3 percent said that they moved in with
relatives while less than 1 percent indicated that they moved out. These findings are similar to the
results shown by Lokshin at al., (2000) concerning the poverty coping strategies of single parent
households in Russia. By moving in with other household members, families can use the advantages
of economies of scale with respect to household size, the efficiency of inter-household transfers
relative to intra-household transfers, and the sharing of domestic duties and child care duties.
Moreover, responses to coping strategies vary by gender. Figure 1 shows the non-parametric
approximation of the distributions 4 of responses for the selected strategies. When asked about the
changes in  expenditures  on  food,  59.3 percent  of women  reported  that  they decreased such
expenditures, compared to only 48.5 percent of men. Similarly, women more often (66.9 percent)
report that they cut their expenses on clothing and shoes than men did (58.1 percent). There are
several possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, women may be better informed about the
household budget and thus their judgement is more precise. Alternatively, this may represent an
indicator of the biases toward men in the intra-household budget allocation.
Women also seem to be more active in using social networks. Graphs at the bottom part of
Figure 1 demonstrate that women are more likely to turn to relatives and friends for help than men.
Twenty percent of all female respondents indicated that they use relatives to help them to cope with
hardship, compared to only 15  percent of men. The proportion of individuals who asked their friends
for help are lower: About 7 percent of women and 6.5 percent of men. Among the individuals who
sought assistance with the social security departments or some other government organizations,
women used state-provided supports twice more often than men.
4  We used Cleveland's  lowess  running-line  smoother  for these  approximations.
7However, men more often find supplementary work as a  way to  cope with economic
hardship: approximately 8 percent of male respondents reported that they found an additional job
to adjust to the changes in economic conditions compared to only 5.4 percent of women.
4. Poverty coping strategies and household characteristics
So far our analysis has concentrated on individual respondents. However, the very fact that women
differ from men in the set of strategies they use suggests that there may exist a complementarity 5
of strategies within households. In the end, household consumption is the measuring stick for
welfare. Therefore, households  should  be the most  appropriate level  of  aggregation and  the
measured unit of analysis.
To move to the household  level from individual responses we have to tally individual
responses of household members. The procedure here is two-step. First, we combine individual
responses into three broad clusters. Individuals who chose at least one of the options in a cluster are
classified as employing this type of action. Second, if any member of a household has chosen a
strategy or response from a cluster, the household is counted as using this type of action. Such a
procedure leads to a minimum loss of information, as all the members of a household are given the
same weight.
We group different responses based on the intensity of use of household human, physical,
financial and social capital (Table 2). The first set of strategies aims at actively changing the place
of a household in a society by relying on its own human capital and physical assets. We call these
active strategies (C 1). Such strategies include an increase in home production, change in place of
residence, finding supplementary work, renting out an apartment, and ceasing living with relatives.
The second set of strategies aims at using the existing social nets for support (C2). This set includes
strategies such as turning to relatives and/or friends for assistance, moving in with relatives, and
5  We tried  to test formally  the hypothesis  about  the complementarity  of individual  coping  strategies
withing  the household.  On a sub-sample  of the households  with married  couples,  we estimated  the
correlations  between  the strategies  used  by husbands  and wives  with the control  for individual  and
household  characteristics.  Our  estimations  fail  to show  any significant  correlations  between  the strategies
the spouses  employ  to cope with hardship.  That does  not reject  the hypothesis  about  the existence  of such
complementarities,  but can be attributed  to the measurement  errors  (in our case  the different  interpretation
of the strategy  questions  by respondents).
8turning for assistance to the Government. Opposing  these active coping strategies, many households
responded to changes by cutting on spending or taking fewer holidays. We combine these responses
into the third cluster (C3) 6.
In about 6 percent of households none of the respondents answered the question on coping
strategies, and we excluded them from further analysis. Motivating this exclusion includes the fact
that some of these respondents represent cases of wealthy households that were not affected by the
crisis. Indeed, we found that many of those who did not provided answers were in the top deciles
of the distribution in both rounds (1996 and 1998). But the second part of this group clearly consists
of non-responses and is fairly homogeneously distributed across deciles. An absence of responses
in  the data is represented  in  both  cases,  making those answers empirically unusable for the
estimations.
What determines the choice of a particular coping strategy by a household? To answer this
question we analyze  how the choices of the strategies depends on household characteristics. The fact
that household members may choose different strategies, and that in the end all these types of
strategies can be used by a household simultaneously, determines the econometric specification of
the problem.
Empirical specification
Assume that a household utility is a continuous, twice continuously differentiable function of a
consumption of a composite good, a leisure of its members and household characteristics that play
the role of taste shifters. Maximizing its utility, the household chooses to apply one or more strategy.
Each strategy is associated with costs and benefits for the household. If costs of a certain strategy
are lower than its benefits, the household chooses to enact such behavior. For example, if a family
decides to move in with other household members, such co-habitation may be associated with the
smaller  costs  of transfers  from the  household to  its  family, increasing  returns to  household
production, economies through bulk discounts, and the help of other household members in child
6  As with any aggregation  we lose information  by combining  strategies  and responses  into clusters.
Different  groupings  can also be suggested.  However,  we argue  that our choice  of strategy-clusters  is
meaningful  and it allows  econometric  analysis  of simultaneous  decisions  of the households  to use
different  strategies.
9care. Of course, co-residence may entail some costs, in particular a loss of privacy, a loss of some
parts of social networks such as neighbors and friends, and a possible increase in time to commute
to work.
Assuming that  the unobserved gain G. associated with the choice of strategy set j  by
household i can be approximated by a linear combination of the exogenous variables, the observed
choice of the particular set of strategies can be presented as:
,  1  f  j 1 >0  if  }  j=1,2,3,  andCorr(7,Ek)￿0  for Vk,j  (1)
K  = 0  otherwise
where Yij is an indicator variable of the choice of the set of strategies j, Pj  is a vector of unknown
coefficients, Xi is a vector of household and individual-specific exogenous variables, ei is an error
term, and 1 indicates the states with a strategy implemented and 0 indicates the state where a
strategy is not used. Clearly, error terms of these three equations will be correlated. This correlation
is determined by the unobserved variables that affect the probability of implementing the strategies.
For example, households that experienced large income shocks would be more likely to use all three
types of actions to cope. Under an assumption of a joint normality of the distribution of the error
terms,  system  (1)  can be  estimated  by  the  method  of  maximum  likelihood. An  individual
contribution of each observation would be represented by the ti-variate  normal cumulative density
function 7. The descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables in the model are
shown in Table 3.
Our dependent variables are three binary indicators corresponding to the three types of
coping, i.e., active strategies, strategies based on social networks, and passive household responses.
We estimate the system of equation (1) based on three alternative sets of explanatory variables. First,
the simplest, specification (I) includes the household specific factors: a logarithm of total household
expenditure in 1996,  demographic characteristics of the household, such as a logarithm of household
size, household type, type of household settlement (urban or rural), age and age squared of the head,
level of education of the head, head employment status, subjective assessment of the head in 1996
about the probability of losing a job and changes in household characteristics (to partly control for
7  One can think  of estimating  the household  choice  of C  I, C2, and C3 in a multinominal  logit
(MNL)  setup.  However,  our specification  allows  for a more  flexible  error structure  by relaxing  the
assumption  of MINL  about  the zero cross-diagonal  elements  in a variance-covariance  matrix.
10unobservable characteristics that proxy the exposure to risk). We also introduce two variables to
control for the effect of land ownership on the choice of strategy.
In the second specification (II) we extend a set of the household-level explanatory variables
with the characteristics of the locality. This specification takes into account externalities inherent
in the choice of coping strategy.
Local economic conditions may determine the returns of different strategies and affect the
stream of benefits from the use of any given strategy. In addition to explicit monetary and non-
monetary costs of applying a strategy there are also information costs, associated with learning how
to apply a certain strategy. For example, growing more vegetables on a household plot may require
knowledge about seeds, pesticides, fertilizers etc. There are clear externalities in gathering such
information at the local level: when more households are involved in the same type of activity, the
costs for each are lower, as households learn from each other. Therefore, it is important to include
in the estimation the information on how widely each strategy is used at the local level 8.
We use the local unemployment rate and the mean income in the area to proxy the level of
development in the locality. The level of inequality can also influence the choice of a strategy by
a household, influencing both the costs and benefits.
The last specification (III) includes information about the previous working history of the
household head, tracing the link between past stratification and the actual use of coping strategies.
When the information on the actual benefits and costs of any strategy is costly, households may
choose to rely on their past experiences in choosing their strategy. The survey does not contain any
information on the strategies that a household has used prior to the recall period of 12 months, and
we have to proxy this history by the social strata that the household head belongs to. We assume
therefore that the  choice  of the strategies in some part is determined by the place in the old
stratification.
8  We  use an aggregate  information  from  the 160  localities  (sites) selected  in our sample.  On
average  there  are 20 households  in a locality.
11Results of estimations
The results of the estimation of the system of equations (1) are shown in Table 4. According to the
likelihood-ratio test criterion, the independent error term specifications are rejected in favor of the
specifications with the correlated errors.
Active (C 1) and social network (C2) strategies are used by two distinct types of households.
There is a strong correlation between the level of human capital in the household and the type of
strategy the household is more likely to use.
An  estimation  of  Specification  I  demonstrates  that  households  with  younger  heads,
households with higher levels of education, and larger households are significantly more likely to
implement strategies that are based on the household's  own resources. A negative significant
coefficient on the variable indicating the fear of losing a job also points to the strong effect of the
human capital component in the household decision to apply such strategies. If the head was afraid
to lose his job  in 1996 that would indicate a lack of skills that are necessary to secure the job
position. This variable contains information concerning the self-assessment of marketable skills that
are otherwise unobserved.
The level of pre-crisis expenditure indirectly reflects how well the household adjusted to the
previous shocks. It looks like across all specifications there exists a positive correlation between the
welfare prior to the crisis and a probability that the household will choose active strategies (C 1), and
a negative correlation between the level of welfare and the use of social networks strategies (C2).
These signs suggest that richer households have better prospects to cope more effectively with the
hazards of crisis by using active strategies. On the other hand, poorer households tend to rely more
on soliciting help.
Among other variables, changes in household size have a positive effect on the probability
of using active strategies. Pensioner households (the omitted dummy category in Table 4) are
significantly less likely to rely on active strategies than other households. Both variables on land
ownership have positive and significant coefficients.
The households that are more likely to use social network strategies (C2) had lower levels
of pre-crisis expenditure, and are from urban areas. Relative to households of pensioners, all other
types of households have a higher probability to use this type of coping strategy. It is particularly
12notorious  that  single  parent  households  use  this  strategy  most  often.  Households  with  an
unemployed head are also significantly more likely to rely on social networks. Estimations fail to
reveal any statistically significant effects of education, self-assessment of marketable skills or land
ownership on the choice of network strategies.
The households that are more likely to use passive action (C3) are households of pensioners
and urban households. Land ownership has a significant and negative effect on the probability to use
these passive responses.
Introducing the local area effects (Specification II) does not seem to affect the sign and
significance of the coefficient for main  household characteristics. However, how often other
households use a strategy in a locality does significantly affect the choice, controlling for individual
characteristics. Specifically, a dichotomy between active (C1) and passive (C3) strategies appears:
there is a clear bunching of regions where there is a predominance of using an active strategy, and
where households are much more likely to adopt such strategies to cope with the crisis. On the other
hand, there are regions where many households adopt a passive strategy and are more likely to rely
on cutting their expenditures in the case of a crisis. As expected, introduction of local effects
changes considerably the sign and significance of an urban dummy compared to Specification I.
Finally, when we introduce the occupation of the household head in 1991 to reflect the place
of a household in the old pre-transition stratification, we do find significant effects from the past
experiences. As the  omitted category in that  case is "managerial  workers,"  we find  that the
households headed by any other person are much less likely to use active strategies. Households
headed by those who were clerical personnel in 1991 are more likely to use social networks. Those
involved in elementary service occupations were most likely to cope with crisis by using passive
strategies.
Our results are comparable with the results of the qualitative study of household survival
strategies in the Novosibirsk oblast of Russia. Tchrenina (1996) found that the households with
higher educated heads (professionals and scientists) were more likely to choose active strategies to
cope with poverty. Eighty five percent of professional families used individual plots, and 3  5 percent
receive income from multiple jobs. At the same time, 30 percent of such households reported that
they received money from relatives and all the respondents pointed out the wide use of social safety
nets to improve their financial situation. Households in rural Siberia relied heavily on individual
13plots and help from relatives (73 percent) and friends (49 percent) to cope with economic hardship.
The degree of reliance on government agencies was very low.
Effectiveness of the strategies in protecting households against shocks
How effective are the strategies in offsetting shocks to household consumption? To illustrate the
effectiveness of the different types of coping strategies in protecting households from shocks we
estimate a regression of the change in household consumption between two years (1996 and 1998)
with the set of household characteristics and strategy type dummies used as explanatory variables.
The difficulty in interpreting the results of such regression is that the current consumption
is endogenous to the actions that households undertake in response to the shocks. In other words,
the  level of consumption  we observe  is a  result of the exogenous  consumption changes the
households have experienced and the strategies the households used to cope with these shocks.
Although the estimated coefficients of such regression may be biased 9, we try to  evaluate the
direction of the bias, and adjust our results accordingly.
The households that experienced large negative consumption shocks would be more likely
to  employ all  coping strategies it can to  offset the drop in its  intake.  At the same time,  the
households whose consumption did not fall, or declined only moderately would be less inclined to
take such actions. Thus, we can assume  that the size of the consumption shock is negatively
correlated with the probability to use coping strategies. If this  is true, the  coefficients on the
endogenous variables in the regression will be downward biased, or, in other words, if we have a
positive (negative) coefficient without control for endogeneity,  then with the control the coefficient
will be even larger (smaller). Table 5 shows the results of the estimation of the regression of the
9  In the regression  relating  changes  in consumption  with the indicators  for the implemented
strategies,  the estimated  coefficients  will be biased,  as the dummies  are correlated  with the error  term.
One  way to correct  for that endogeneity  bias is to use instrumental  variables,  or, altematively,  we can
estimate  the change  in consumption  regression  simultaneously  with the three equations  in the system  (1)
under  an assumption  of the  joint correlation  of the error terms.  In the first case, we would  need a set of
identifying  variables  that affect a choice  of strategies,  but are uncorrelated  with the changes  in household
consumption.  We cannot  think of any such  variables.  In the second  case  we can identify  the system  of
four  equations  from  non-linearities  (although  such identification  is usually  weak),  but the estimation  of
such system  is rather  difficult.
14changes in log-consumption on the set of explanatory variables from specification (II)'° with the
addition of three dummies variables for the different types of strategies.
Households that used active strategies offset shocks better. The coefficient on the active
strategies dummy is positive and significant. The estimation failed to reveal a significant effect of
the social safety net strategy on changes in household consumption. Passive responses are shown
to be ineffective in coping with the shocks.
5. Social exclusion
We now turn to the question of social exclusion or marginalization. The stress on formal and
informal institutions that survived the socialist era and transitional crisis, along with widespread
impoverishment are factors contributing to the marginalization and potential social exclusion of
many individuals and social groups in transitional economies. The concept of social exclusion that
first arose in Europe, in the wake of prolonged and large scale unemployment (Silver 1994), is
related to  social isolation (lack of meaningful ties to the family, local or national community,
associations, organizations and so forth) and the lack of legal rights and/or inability to defend them.
There is a general consensus that the inability of individuals or social groups to participate fully in
the economy, in social life, and in political processes reduces social solidarity, augments social
tensions, and holds back social development.
Every subsequent crisis is likely to  have a particularly heavy toll on the livelihoods of
marginalized groups, pushing them even further outside the mainstream. This is a very dangerous
tendency  since it makes poverty deeply entrenched in societies and unresponsive to economic
progress generated by growth. Better understanding of how social exclusion effects different groups
may assist in devising specific ways to promote social inclusion.
There exists a substantial group of households in the sample (28 percent) whose only
response to the crisis was a reduction in consumption (C3 only). We catagorize this type of reaction
as marginalization responses. Who are these households? Why are they unable to find resources
10  We  use Specification  II  for the simulations  because  of a substantial  drop in the sample  size  (see
Table  4) in estimation  under Specification  III due to missing  responses  on the previous  work  history
question.
15within their households, or rely on social networks, or turn to the government to improve their
conditions?
To examine the effects of the household characteristics on the probability that the household
did not use any types of coping strategies other than a reduction in consumption, we simulate how
households would respond to changes in the specific variables in the model. In a given simulation,
a certain value of the variable of interest is assigned to all the households in the sample. The
simulated probabilities are generated for each household using the coefficients fromjoint estimation
of the system of equations (1) under the Specification II. Next, the value of the variable of interest
is changed, and this changed value is assigned to the entire sample of households. Then the new set
of simulated probabilities  is generated. The effect of the changes in  a particular parameter is
calculated as the difference in these simulated probabilities.
Table  6 presents  the results  of  these simulations.  Relative  to  other household  types,
households headed by pensioners are significantly more likely to use marginalization responses.
Simulations reveal that among households at risk of social exclusion are smaller households,
households headed by a person with a high school diploma only, households whose head was afraid
to lose his job in 1996, and households whose size decreased between the two rounds of the survey.
We found a significant negative effect of land ownership on the probability of relying on passive
responses. The higher the level of unemployment in the locality, the more likely it is that the only
response of the households to the crisis is a decrease is consumption.
Probability differences in using the marginalization response by various demographic groups
are illustrated in Table 7, which reports predicted probabilities based on coefficients in Table 6 and
corresponding  mean values for independent  variables. Such predictions offer a useful guide to policy
as they use an observed demographic type of household to see how likely it is to be limited in its
response options to  crisis, and therefore directly addresses the vulnerability of a household to
poverty. Clear differences between household types emerge. Single pensioners are at particular risk
of choosing marginalization responses and it is predicted that close to 60 percent of them would not
use any active response. On the other hand, multi-children households appear to have a relatively
low predicted probability of relying solely on cutting spending.
166. Conclusion
A disintegration of the former social network milieu was a significant result of  the Russian
economic transition.  As  many social  networks withered away, households  found themselves
vulnerable to economic shocks as their ability to cope with risks became severely limited. The
effective reintegration of individuals into social networks and new institutions is therefore an
important component of poverty alleviation strategies. However, the success in empowernent will
depend crucially on the  activity of people  in  changing  their  social status  and  building new
relationships with their peers and neighbors. Contrarily, a passive suffering from the economic woes
of transition leads to a loss of community ties to and an exclusion from new opportunities opened
by market reforms. Thus the trends toward marginalization of certain groups needs to be monitored
and minimized, while active efforts to cope are supported by the Government.
The results of our analysis clearly indicates that the choices of survival strategies are strongly
determined by the level of human capital in the household. The higher the household human capital,
the more likely it chooses active strategies.
Moreover, our work indicates that social exclusion is quite widespread in Russia. The groups
that are likely to choose strategies leading to marginalization are not that difficult to reach with
traditional government interventions: they are predominantly urban pensioners and poorly educated
pre-retirement individuals. Protecting the real value of state transfers  is therefore important to
decrease the tendency towards stratification of these large social groups.
The small proportion of individuals who turned for help to government agencies and their
dissatisfaction with the services reveal an inadequacy and weakness of the existing system of social
protection. The track record leaves little hope for dramatic changes in the Russian social safety net
in the near future. Thus, low-cost policy measures that help households to implement their own
strategies of coping with economic hardship can have an important impact on the welfare of the
Russian population. Such policies may include the development of regionally targeted programs of
part-time and temporary employment,  improvements in information services for individuals wishing
to change jobs, and development of retraining programs.
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19Table 1: Use of various strategies by individuals and their assessments of strategy effectiveness.
Percent  of respondents  who find the strategy:
Strategy  Percentage  very helpful  somewhat  not helpful  No answer
report  using  helpful  at all
New job  12  29  42  27  3
Job in the Government  5  39  41  16  4
Secondary job  7  32  58  9  1
Got retraining  2  34  35  25  7
Moved to the new place of residence  9  21  38  28  13
Grew more on land plot  19  35  60  4  1
Asked relatives for help  21  35  59  5  1
Asked friends  for help  8  28  60  11  I
Asked Government  for help  5  11  41  46  1
Sold their  belongings  5  15  70  14  1
Rented  out apartment  1  35  55  9  2
Moved in with relatives  3  39  49  7  5
Ceased living with relatives  2  20  49  28  3
Cut spending  on clothing  63  12  53  32  4
Had fewer meals  54  10  53  33  5
Postponed/did  not take holiday  27  16  46  39  0
20Table 2: Household strategies of coping with crisis. Self-assessment by 1996 expenditure deciles.
Expenditure  deciles
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  All
Cultivated  more on  personal plot  12.91  14.35  17.95  18.55  23.19  20.96  21.90  23.16  19.28  19.30  19.16
Rented  out your  apartment  0.48  0.48  1.93  0.96  0.36  0.84  2.05  1.21  0.72  2.17  1.00
Cl  Ceased living with relatives  2.41  1.57  1.45  1.45  2.05  1.69  0.84  1.81  1.33  4.46  1.04
Change place of residence  9.53  9.65  9.64  10.48  5.31  5.30  9.51  7.48  6.63  10.74  5.07
Found supplementary  work  5.43  5.91  5.18  5.42  6.64  8.19  6.86  9.53  7.11  9.77  7.00
Sold  belongings  4.70  4.70  4.22  4.34  4.83  3.86  4.81  3.50  3.86  6.03  4.18
Turned  to relatives  for assistance  25.09  25.45  22.77  17.59  20.53  19.52  20.10  18.09  16.02  19.18  20.43
C2  Turned  to friends  for assistance  8.69  9.17  7.59  7.59  7.85  7.83  8.06  7.36  5.66  9.65  7.95
Moved in with relatives  3.14  3.26  5.18  5.06  3.02  2.65  4.45  2.29  2.53  1.93  3.35
Turned  to the government  for assistance  4.95  4.95  5.42  7.47  5.43  4.58  3.61  3.38  3.25  4.58  4.76
Cut down on buying clothing and shoes  64.41  68.76  67.23  66.87  65.82  63.37  60.77  59.83  59.52  52.11  62.87
C3  Cut down on meals  65.26  63.45  63.13  57.11  53.62  53.61  49.10  46.68  48.80  35.46  53.76
Spend less money on holidays, vacations  35.22  38.96  37.83  38.07  38.04  39.76  36.82  40.17  40.24  38.48  37.19
21Table 3: Summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables.
Mean  Standard  Error
Dependent  variables
Active strategies  (Cl )  0.427  binary
Social  net strategies  (C2)  0.451  binary
Passive reponses  (C3)  0.942  binry
Independent  variables  -
Log  of expenditure  96  8A4-80  1.050
Cash  benefits  96  1  965.000  1423.000
Log  of household  size  0.950  0.529
Nuclear  family  1  0.253  binary
Single  parent  0.070  binary
Other  households  with  children  0.213  binary
Households  with  adults  only  0.156  binary
Urban  households  I  0.664  binary
Age of househol head  4640  15.  328
Age2  of household  head  1  2385.539  1528.905
High  school  0.517  binary
TechnicalVocational  0.310  binary
Unemployed  98  0.127  binary
Afraid  to lose a  job in 1996  0.367  binary
Change  in cashbenefits  96-97  -101.610  1265.173
Cbange in household  size  I  -0.021  0.907
Change  in  share of small  children  -0.013  0.098
Change  in share of older  children  I  -0.001  0.130
Change  in share of pensioners  0.018  0.170
Household  owns  dacha  0.252  binary
Household  owns land  0.654  binary
Coeff.  of variation  in expenditure  112.575  98.956
Log  of mean  expenditure  8.650  0.857
Unemployment  level  0.120  0.094
Mean  active strategies  (CI)  0.385  0.162
Mean  social  net strategies  (C2)  0.409  0.166
Mean  passive  strategies  (3)  0.854  0.139
Not employed  before 1991  1  0.020  binary
Processionals  0.120  binry
Technicians  and associatives  0.084  binary
Clerks  0.032  binay
Services,  Shops  workers  !  0.035  binary
Skilled  agriculturalt  and fishery  0.004  binary
Crafts  and related  work  0.221  binary
Industrial  workers  0,274  binary
Elementary  workers  1  0.083  binary
i____  Arm forces  0.110  binaaa
22Table  4: Simultaneous  estimation  of the household  choices  of strategies.
Specification  I  Specification  II  Specification  III
CI  C2  C3  Cl  C2  C3  C1  C2  C3
Log of expenditure  96  0.051'  -0.060"  -0.004  0.093"  -0,046  -0.009  0.092"  -0.025  -0.005
Cash  benefits  96  0.175  -0.553'  0.355i  0.542'  -0.705"  0.391  0.576'  -0.825"  0.317
Log  of household  size  0,389"'  0.318."  0.394"i  0.340"  0.330"  0.548"'  0.334"  0.486"'  0.068"
Nuclear  family  10.091  0.246"  -0.288'!  0.136  0.192'  -0.341'1  0.152  0.159  0.602
Single  parent  0.198'  0.459"  -0.189'  0.187  0.459"'  -0.137  0.184  0.539"'  -0.162
Other  households  with  children  10.209"  0.196'  -0.361'  1  0.202'  0.187'  -0.254  0.266"  0.149  0.010
Households  with  adults  only  0.255"  0.254"  -0.157-  0.261"  Q.  194"  -0.144  0.285"  0.279"  .0.221
Urban  households  1-0.303..  0.258"'  0.292" |  -0.101  0.040  -0.251'  -0.114  0.014  -0.040"
Age  of household  head/I00  0.016  -0.030  0.014;  0.019  -0.029"  0.0201  -0.025 -0.056"'  -0.488
Age2  of household  head/10000  |  -0.198'  0.247  -0.0821  -0.229'  0.233"  -0.128!  0.314  0.566"  0.007
High school  -0.326"'  0.109  0.095  -0.319.'  0.110  0.086  -0.381  0.087  0.050
Technical/Vocational  -0.119'  0.072  0.0991  -0.108  0.079  0.0741  -0.165..  0.079  0.087
Unemployed  98  0.085  0.145'  0,0351  0.074  0.138  0.119  0.049  0.099  0.122'
Afraid  to lose  ajob in 1996  I -0.165"  0.002  0.054  1 -0.161"  -0.034  -0.0761 -0.149"  -0.060  0.361
Change  in cash  benefits  96-97  -0.081  -0.237  0.213  0.093  -0.393  0.230  -0.062  -0.482  -0.124
Change  in share  of small  children 1  0.243  -0.365  0.0241  0.355  -0.298  -0.0851  0.300  -0.416  0.286
Change  in share  of older  children  0.080  -0.187  0.044  0.106  -0.272  0.004  0,010  -0.471*  0.127
Change  in share  of pensioners  I  -0.019  -0.504"  0.040  j  -0.050  -0.491'  -0.0471  0.109  -0.598  -0.148
Household  owns  dacha  0.216"  0.009  0.292**  0.225"  -0.022  0.280'  0.  198**  0.008  0.355"
Household  owns  land  |  0.392"'  -0.050 -0.250**  1 0.349"'  -0.033  -0.192  0.374"'  -0.026  -0.269'
Coeff.  of variation  in expenditure  0.001'  -0.000  0.000;  0.001"  0.000  -0.000
Log of mean  expenditure  1  I  -0.130'  -0.004  -0.0781 -0.158"  -0.013  -0.064
Unemployment  level  -0.311  -0.454  -0.037  I  -0.340  -0.612  -0.514
Meanactivestrategies(CI)  13.337--  -0,498"  -1.313'. 1  3.113"'  -0.374 -1.318"'
Mean  social  net strategies  (C2)  -0.093  3.340"'  -0.261  0.059  3.395"'  0.017
Mean  passive  strategies  (C3)  i  1  -0.973"'  -0.815"'  3.369"'. -1.015"'  -1.036"'-  3.559"'
Not employed  before  1991  -1.165"  0.064  6.010
Professionals  I  -0.737"  0.202  0.773'
Technicians  and associatives  -0.548'  0,491"  0.367
Clerks  I  i  -1.072"*  0.345  0.536
Services.  Shops  workers  -0.922"  0.105  0.867'
Skilled  agricultural  and fishery  |  !I-0.418  -0.359  0.052
Crafts and related  work  -0.653"  0.342  0.546
Industrial  workers  I  I  I -0.627"  0.268  0.559
Elementary  workers  -0.97  1"  0.247  0,684'
Arm  forces  1  -0.732"  0.391  0.439
Constant  -1.394"  0.725"  0.920'  -1.111  0.242  -0.283  0.579  0.198  -1.029
p's  P12=.
15 6 p[3=-.384  p23=-.1 14  P,2= 146  p13=-. 332 P23=-'1
21 P12=1
48 P, =_
2 49 p23- 
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Log-likelihood  -3427.07  -3017.05  -2270.38
N  2543  2543  1945
Note: (*) means the coefficient is significant at 10% level, (**) - 5% level, (***) - 1% level
23Table 5: Regression of changes in logs of household expenditure 1998-1996.
____________  _  Coefficient  Standard Error
Active strategies  0.076*  0.044
Social safety net strategies  -0.033  0.043
Passive responses  .0.198*  0,089
I.og of  household size  -0.108*  0.064
Nuclear family  0.220***  0.071
Single parent  0.171**  0.086
Other households with children  0.215**  0.076
Households with adults only  0.038  0.065
Urban households  -0.088*  0.055
Age of household head/100  0.473  0.801
Age2 of household head/10000  -0,391  0.842
High school  0.041  0.056
TechnicalNocational  -0.038  0.059
Unemployed 98  -0.031  0.063
Afraid to lose a job in 1996  0.030  0.048
Change in household size  0.199***  0.025
Change in share of small children  0.069  0.258
Change in share of older children  0.027  0.185
Change in share of pensioners  -0.289**  0.126
Household owns dacha  0.002  0.055
Household owns land  -0.009  0.052
Log of mean expenditure  0.083**  0.041
Coefficient of variation in expenditure  -0.505*  0.364
Unemployment level  -0.247  0.232
Mean strategy 1  0.083  0.145
Mean strategy 3  0.071  0.142
Mean strategy 2  -0.375**  0.159
onstan  -0.546  0.422
Note: (*) means the coefficient is significant at 10% level, (**)  - 5% level, (***)  - 1%  level
24Table 6. Effect of covariates on probability to use only passive strategy
Specification II
dP/dx  Standard Error')
Log of expenditure 96  0,002  0.011
Cash benefits 96  1  -0.031  0.113
Log of household size  -0.121...  0.034
Nuclear family  -0.061  0.037
Single parent  -0.120"  0.036
Other households with children  -0.068'  0.037
Households with adults only  -0.111  0.030
Urban households  0.002  0.029
Age of household head  0.003  0.004
Age2 of household head  0.001  0.042
Hligh  school  0.066**  0.029
Technical/Vocational  0.006  0.031
Unemployed 98  -0.073**  0.031
Afraid to lose ajob  in 1996  0.061**  0.025
Change in cash benefits 96-97  -0.004  0.115
Change in household size  -0.083***  0.014
Change in share of small children  0.034  0.137
Change in share of older children  0.028  0.096
Change in share of pensioners  0.076  0.064
Household owns dacha  -0.031  0.028
Household owns land  -0.071**  0.027
Coeff. of variation in expenditure  0.000  0.000
Log of mean expenditure  0.014  0,026
Unemployment level  0.002*  0.001
Mean strategy I  .0,008***  0.001
Mean strategy 3  0.006***  0.001
Mean strategy 2  Q0,007***  O.001
')The standard errors of simulations are calculated using variance-covariance matrix from thejoint estimation of system (I) and than
applying Cholesky decomposition to obtain the standard errors of transformation.
Note: (*) means the coefficient is significant at 10%  level, (**)  - 5% level, (***)  - 1%  level
25Table 7. Simulated probabilities to use only passive strategies  for the selected types of households.
Household type  Predicted probability
Nuclear family, two children  42.2
Single parent, one child  27.3
Households with more than 3 children  24.8
Single pensioner  56.6
Households without children  28.4
Note: predictions are made at sample means.
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